Information Warfare — 2026-05-18

Report Documents Russia's Systematic Pre-Attack Disinformation Targeting Ukrainian Civilian Sites

BLUFA 161-page legal framework for prosecuting senior Russian officials and propagandists under the Rome Statute for pre-attack disinformation operations marks the first systematic theory linking information alibis to criminal liability for strikes on Ukrainian civilian targets, though no ICC or national prosecutor has signaled adoption.

Global Rights Compliance published a 161-page report on May 16, co-authored with The Reckoning Project, documenting Russia's systematic use of 'information alibis,' pre-emptive disinformation operations designed to deflect responsibility for attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets. The report identifies President Putin, Foreign Minister Lavrov, and senior presidential administration officials including Sergei Kiriyenko and Alexei Gromov as key coordinators, operating through state media, government-affiliated NGOs such as ANO Dialog, military bloggers with an estimated audience of 10 million, and over 100,000 social media pages. Case studies detail how disinformation was planted before specific strikes: Russian UN Ambassador Nebenzia and MFA spokesperson Zakharova falsely claimed the Mariupol maternity ward was occupied by Ukrainian forces hours before the March 2022 airstrike, while Telegram channels fabricated narratives about the Kakhovka dam beginning in October 2022, eight months before its June 2023 destruction. The report proposes a five-step investigative framework for prosecuting senior Russian officials and propagandists under the Rome Statute, arguing that information alibis materially contributing to international crimes are not protected speech.

Analysis
Published by two Open Society-funded advocacy organizations from a single evidentiary base, the prosecution framework is the first systematic legal theory for holding Russian propagandists individually accountable under the Rome Statute. Prior accountability efforts never reached the information warfare apparatus. Disinformation planted eight months to over a year before specific strikes builds the evidentiary case for organizational premeditation, not reactive spin. The ICC's jurisdictional limits, resource constraints, and practical inability to secure custody over named senior Russian officials may render the framework aspirational. Policymakers backing accountability mechanisms must judge whether this prosecution theory advances practical deterrence or displaces more actionable enforcement paths.

1 sources

Manufacturing Impunity: Russian Information Operations in Ukraine - Global Rights Compliance