Adversary Intelligence — 2026-07-08

EU Businessman With FSB Ties Supplied Lithuanian Lubricants to Russian Defense Industry After Ukraine Invasion

BLUFUAE re-export hubs gave a sanctioned German businessman with documented FSB ties a two-year runway to feed lubricants into Russian naval engine production before EU enforcers caught up.

A joint investigation by The Insider and Lithuanian outlet Siena found that companies belonging to German businessman Juri Sudheimer, who delivered a marked FSB cash bribe to then-Kirov governor Nikita Belykh in 2016 with the funds originating from the FSB rather than Sudheimer personally, continued supplying Russia with Mannol-brand lubricating oils used at defense industry plants for more than a year after the full-scale invasion 12. Klaipeda-based SCT Lubricants shipped directly to Russian firm JSC NLK in Kirov until early 2023, with both companies beneficially owned by Sudheimer 1. Shipments then continued through UAE-registered intermediaries Chempioil FZE and SCT Chemicals FZE, also linked to Sudheimer, with SCT Chemicals FZE customs data showing 1,080 tons imported to Russia in 2024 and 550 tons in the first quarter of 2025, while Chempioil FZE separately shipped roughly 300 tons in 2023 and 370 tons in 2024 12. In 2026 the EU sanctioned SCT Chemicals FZE for supplying lubricants used in diesel engines built at Russia's Kolomna Plant, a Defense Ministry supplier the EU had separately sanctioned in December 2023 for producing engines for Russian warships 12. Sudheimer confirmed his ownership ties to both UAE firms but denied shipping Lithuanian products to Russia after the relevant ban took effect, telling Siena that 2023 shipments routed via Uzbekistan were intended for that market and that his companies could not control the goods' onward movement, and said he would legally challenge the sanctions 12.

Analysis
A single, uncorroborated Insider/Siena investigation nonetheless documents a durable evasion pattern: after direct Klaipeda-to-Kirov shipments to JSC NLK ended in early 2023, the same Sudheimer-linked lubricant flow persisted for roughly two years through UAE intermediaries before triggering an EU designation, showing export controls on Lithuanian producers can be routed around via Emirati re-export hubs and Central Asian transit paperwork well ahead of enforcement. Sudheimer's disclosed role funneling FSB bribe money to a Russian governor in 2016 undercuts the credibility of his current denials, though his claim that Uzbekistan-declared shipments were diverted onward by buyers outside his control points to third-party transshipment fraud rather than orchestrated evasion. The Kolomna Plant's end use extends sanctions-evasion exposure from drones and electronics into naval engine production inputs.

2 sources