Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War
Approximately 400 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium remain buried under rubble at the
The Iran war has fractured IAEA verification authority, NPT security bargains, and U.S.-led civil nuclear cooperation, with no existing mechanism to address all three. Iran's IAEA access denial eliminates the verification baseline any deal requires, leaving the enrichment impasse, full cessation versus an asserted enrichment right, unresolvable. Washington's surveillance-and-strike posture substitutes deterrence for verification with no defined endpoint. The NPT withdrawal threat, if executed, would strip the legal scaffolding from future diplomacy; Tehran's near-term priorities center on conventional deterrence rather than formal exit, and the threat is primarily coercive. Preserving Riyadh's enrichment rights under the pending U.S.-Saudi framework would erode the
2 sources
- Reordering the Nuclear Regime in the Wake of the Iran War -
National Interest - Iran and the Changing Character of the Nonproliferation Regime -
Center for Strategic and International Studies