Adversary Intelligence — 2026-09-18

Investigation Maps Russian GRU, FSB, and SVR Intelligence Network Operating Under Diplomatic Cover in Rome

BLUFItaly's exposure of six additional Russian intelligence officers under diplomatic cover in Rome is unlikely to trigger expulsions within three months but maps a broader, multi-service espionage infrastructure targeting NATO from inside allied capitals.

An investigation by Il Riformista's Massimiliano Coccia, published in collaboration with the Kyiv Independent, identifies six additional Russian embassy officials in Rome allegedly tied to Moscow's intelligence services beyond military attachés Ivan Petrovich Gorbachev and Mikhail Vasilyevich Astakhov, whom Italy expelled on July 9 after a Rome prosecutors' probe into two former Italian intelligence officers accused of passing classified information to Russia 1. The investigation names embassy counsellors Igor Alexeyevich Anikeyev and Igor Albertovich Ovechkin as linked to the FSB, focused on Italian military technology and NATO-linked infrastructure, and second and third secretaries Anton Andreyevich Demin and Dmitry Yuryevich Morozenkov as linked to the SVR and GRU, cultivating contacts in Italian cultural, business, and political circles 12. It separately identifies Konstantin Alexeyevich Nemudrov, an attaché accredited to the Holy See whose father was expelled from Italy in 2021 over the Walter Biot espionage case, and reports a source's claim that he has continued part of his father's Vatican contact network 1Formiche.net" data-url="https://formiche.net/2026/09/rete-mosca-roma-uomini-intelligence-russa-italia/" data-rt="secondary" data-otype="magazine">3. The reporting also describes alleged attempts to recruit Belarusian and other Eastern European nationals for sabotage and the systematic collection of digital-infrastructure vulnerability data. Formiche.net and NV.ua both stress these attributions rest on the newspaper's sourcing rather than confirmed Italian government findings 34.

Analysis
July's expulsion of two GRU-linked attachés was almost certainly the visible edge of a wider diplomatic-cover network, but Rome is unlikely to expel any of the six newly named officials within three months absent counterintelligence findings independent of this reporting. Anikeyev and Ovechkin's alleged FSB focus on NATO-linked technology and Demin and Morozenkov's SVR/GRU cultivation of cultural and business contacts describe access-building rather than the caught-in-the-act evidence that triggered July's action, and these same activities could equally reflect routine diplomatic outreach Italian counterintelligence has not itself flagged as espionage. Alongside the GRU's Cuban-recruited arson network, the exposures suggest two concurrent GRU operational models across NATO territory: diplomatic cover and third-country proxy recruitment. Confidence is moderate, resting on one deeply reported investigative thread uncorroborated by Italian government attribution. Further expulsions would signal AISI has moved from journalistic leads to prosecutable evidence and likely prompt reciprocal Russian expulsions; absent that, the network stays operational and Italian defense and Vatican-linked contacts remain exposed without policy response.

4 sources

Chi sono le spie russe che Putin nasconde nell'ambasciata a Roma - Il Riformista
Inside Russias intelligence network in Rome - Decode39
La rete di Mosca a Roma. Chi sono gli uomini dell'intelligence russa in Italia - Formiche.net
Russian Embassy staff in Italy may have recruited foreigners for sabotage — investigation - The New Voice of Ukraine