Nuclear & Arms Control — 2026-09-09
Saudi Arabia Preparing to Grant IAEA Additional Verification Powers for Enrichment and Reprocessing Activities
BLUFSaudi Arabia's bespoke IAEA verification arrangement is unlikely to be finalized and submitted to the Board of Governors by March 2027, leaving enrichment oversight terms undefined as nonproliferation criticism mounts.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told a press conference in Vienna on Monday that a planned US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement will not include Riyadh's signature on the Additional Protocol but will grant the agency verification and monitoring authorizations "very, very similar" to those under that protocol 123. Grossi called the Additional Protocol the "ideal setup" but said the bilateral arrangement would let Saudi Arabia go beyond its core obligations under its existing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA 4. Grossi said the enhanced authorizations would cover uranium enrichment, the preceding conversion step, and reprocessing that can separate plutonium from spent fuel, without elaborating further on specifics 123. The US and Saudi Arabia reached the underlying "123 agreement" in July, permitting Riyadh to enrich uranium and build reactors using US technology 124. Grossi said the bilateral IAEA-Saudi agreement will go to the agency's 35-nation Board of Governors once its terms are finalized 123. Non-proliferation groups including the Arms Control Association have criticized the deal for omitting the full Additional Protocol 123.
AnalysisGrossi's "very, very similar" framing, offered without specifying inspection triggers or access rights, signals the bilateral text remains unfinished and contestable at the IAEA's 35-nation Board of Governors. Finalization within six months is
unlikely given neither government has set a public deadline and the underlying 123 agreement itself took years to negotiate. Confidence is low, resting on a single Vienna press conference with no released text and no independent corroboration beyond outlets reproducing the same Reuters filing. The vague authorizations language may function as a diplomatic formula designed to blunt non-proliferation criticism and ease congressional review rather than signal a substantive verification commitment. Board approval of defined terms would let Congress and IAEA member states assess proliferation risk before Riyadh begins enrichment under the 123 agreement; absent that, they must approve the arrangement on trust alone.
5 sources
- Saudi Arabia preparing to grant IAEA more powers, Grossi says - Dawn
- Saudi Arabia preparing to grant IAEA more intrusive powers, Grossi says - Business Recorder
- IAEA set to win more investigative powers into Saudi Arabia's nuclear program - The Jerusalem Post
- Saudi Arabia preparing to grant IAEA more intrusive powers, Grossi says - Al-Monitor
- Saudi Arabia preparing to grant IAEA more intrusive powers, Grossi says - Reuters (by Francois Murphy, Vienna)
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