IRGC Used Covertly Acquired Chinese Spy Satellite to Target U.S. Military Bases

Analysis
The TEE-01B closes IRGC's collection from a 5-meter floor under Noor-3 to sub-meter resolution, sufficient to track individual aircraft and detect infrastructure changes between sorties, compressing Iranian targeting cycles from days to hours across U.S. Bases in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Bahrain. The delivery mechanism is what export controls weren't architected to stop: commercial in-orbit transfer from Earth Eye Co through Emposat's globally networked ground stations, no arms transaction, no licensed export, just a commercial handoff to a sanctioned military customer. Corroborated across FT's orbital analysis, time-stamped coordinate lists, and pre/post-strike imagery, the acquisition runs alongside MizarVision's publicly annotated targeting datasets (PAC-3 positions at Shaikh Isa, force dispositions at Diego Garcia) which DIA assesses IRGC is layering into strike planning. Beijing may instead have calibrated the transfer as a signal rather than an alliance commitment: enough capability to complicate U.S. Operations without the direct military participation threshold that would invite sanctions escalation against Chinese space enterprises.