European Security — 2026-07-05

Lithuania Agrees to Lift Constitutional Ban on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Bases

BLUFLithuania's cross-party alignment on lifting nuclear hosting restrictions confirms a cascading Baltic norm shift, though the two-vote constitutional threshold makes passage by year's end unlikely.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said parliamentary party leaders agreed on a plan to lift the constitutional ban on nuclear weapons and foreign military bases, calling the provision "outdated" after meeting party leaders Thursday 123. The change targets Article 137, adopted more than three decades ago after Lithuania left the Soviet Union, and would require two-thirds majorities in two parliamentary votes, or possibly a referendum 23. Nauseda said there are no immediate plans to station nuclear weapons in Lithuania and that the country will remain party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while Parliament Speaker Juozas Olekas said the amendments could pass by year's end 12. The move follows Finland's repeal of its own nuclear weapons ban, which took effect Wednesday and drew threats from Russian State Duma Defence Committee deputy chair Aleksey Zhuravlyov that Moscow could "destroy half" of Finland 3.

Analysis
Lithuania's readiness to jettison the Article 137 ban follows Finland's repeal by four months, indicating Baltic states now treat Soviet-era nuclear constraints as liabilities rather than reassurance and tightening the ring of NATO frontline states willing to host nuclear infrastructure. Passage by year's end is unlikely: the amendment needs two successive two-thirds parliamentary majorities or a referendum, a higher bar than Finland cleared in one vote, and Vilnius has fixed no timeline for the second reading. Confidence is moderate, since party leaders converged fast on principle but the referendum-versus-parliament mechanism remains unsettled and could slip past December. Reuters and LRT anchor the reporting as independent primary filings a day apart, while Defense News' near-identical text suggests wire pickup rather than fresh corroboration. Nauseda's explicit disclaimer of any immediate deployment plan suggests the announcement functions chiefly as deterrence signaling toward Moscow. Successful passage would give NATO planners a legal basis to preposition nuclear-capable infrastructure alongside the German brigade due in 2027, while stalled passage keeps Lithuania constitutionally closed and forward posture routed through Poland or the Baltic Sea.

4 sources