Adversary Intelligence — 2026-09-15

Investigation Identifies Russian Presidential Administration Handler and SVR Station Chief Working to Destabilize Latvia Elections

BLUFLatvia likely will move to expel or publicly attribute against at least one named Russian operative before the October 3 Saeima vote, now that cover identities are burned.

An investigation by The Insider identifies 38-year-old Vladimir Balobayev, a Russian Presidential Administration official who took over the Baltic states portfolio in 2024, as Moscow's point man overseeing agencies and propagandists targeting Latvia's October 3 Saeima election 12. The outlet separately names Igor Sorokopud, 43, the Russian embassy's first secretary in Riga, as SVR station chief in Latvia since 2024; per the investigation he trained at Russia's Defense Ministry Military University and the SVR academy and previously worked intelligence operations under diplomatic cover in Iran before his 2024 Riga posting, with operational focus on Latvia's NATO cooperation, Western military aid to Ukraine, and access to Latvian decision-makers 123. The Insider also reports SVR press bureau chief Sergei Guskov orchestrated a false May claim that Ukraine had arranged to launch strikes on Russia from Latvian territory 12. The investigation further links the pro-Kremlin Russian Union of Latvia and several Saeima candidates, including fugitive Aleksejs Rosļikovs, to this network, while Puaro.lv's Latvian-language report corroborates the identification of Balobayev and Sorokopud and their roles 3.

Analysis
Latvia likely will take at least one formal action, expulsion, arrest, or public attribution, against Balobayev, Sorokopud, or Guskov before the October 3 Saeima vote. Naming a sitting SVR station chief and Presidential Administration handler strips away the ambiguity that has let Riga avoid overt confrontation, and its 2023 embassy downgrade and the Ždanoka precedent show its services act once Kremlin networks are mapped publicly. The fabricated May claim tying Ukraine to a planned Latvian strike-launch deal raises the political cost of inaction. Confidence is moderate given reliance on a single outlet's unnamed sourcing, uncorroborated by any Latvian government statement; the investigation could equally reflect a leak or rivalry within Russia's own security services rather than independent journalistic penetration. Formal action before the vote would signal disruption of the Kremlin's influence network and shape voter perception of RSL-aligned candidates; inaction lets that network operate through election day unchallenged.

3 sources