Ukrainian Domestic — 2026-08-14

New DIU Chief Ivashchenko Moves to Remove Budanov Appointees and Build Separate Command Structure

BLUFCoordinated personnel moves by Ivashchenko and Poklad point toward presidential-office consolidation of Ukraine's security apparatus, though independent corroboration within 60 days remains genuinely uncertain.

Ukrainska Pravda reported that DIU chief Oleh Ivashchenko, who replaced Kyrylo Budanov on January 2, is working to weaken Budanov's influence over the agency and has removed a number of Budanov's personnel from their posts, citing security-service sources 1. The same sources said Ivashchenko coordinates closely with acting SSU head Oleksandr Poklad, who flags DIU staff he considers a "high-risk group" for Ivashchenko to act on 1. NV.ua and Hromadske carried the Ukrainska Pravda reporting, with Hromadske adding that Poklad has separately installed new regional SBU directors in eight oblasts and Crimea 2. Interfax-Ukraine, citing military intelligence sources, disputed the "struggle for influence" characterization as media speculation, saying Ivashchenko and Budanov maintain routine dialogue and that Budanov's officers remain in key DIU positions 3.

Analysis
Ivashchenko's purge, coordinated with Poklad's parallel SSU regional shakeup, points toward centralization of security-sector appointments under officials with direct presidential-office ties rather than routine command turnover, though the moves could equally reflect ordinary transition eight months into his tenure, as military-intelligence sources contend. Confidence is low: the claim rests on a single Ukrainska Pravda account that NV.ua and Hromadske merely relay rather than independently confirm, and Interfax-Ukraine's on-record pushback leaves it contested. Whether independent reporting corroborates further Budanov-aligned removals within 60 days is genuinely uncertain. Budanov's own positioning in the Office of the President, including a reported resignation threat over Poklad's appointment, ties the personnel dispute to a wider fight over security-service control; if corroboration emerges, Western partners will need to recalibrate which DIU contacts remain reliable for intelligence-sharing, while unconfirmed reporting leaves existing Budanov-era liaison channels intact.

4 sources