//
OFFLINE — VIEWING CACHED CONTENT
← Back to Archive

IC BRIEF

Current as of 1715 EDT (UTC-04), Saturday 18 July 2026

Contents

8 stories from 28 sources across 27 organizations

KEY JUDGMENTS

We assess the Trump-ordered election-intelligence investigation is unlikely to formally target Chinese state entities within the next four months, even as House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) testimony documents Volt Typhoon pre-positioning inside US critical infrastructure and expanding Chinese espionage against state-level targets. Moderate confidence reflects Navarro's explicit redirection toward domestic actors, the absence of Beijing-naming language in White House or Department of Justice (DOJ) framing, and the September summit's diplomatic constraint. Clayton will likely be confirmed as Director of National Intelligence (DNI) within the next 90 days, inheriting a probe targeting his own workforce before the investigation identifies any analyst.

The summit is the linchpin: absent it, naming Beijing shifts from diplomatically prohibitive to politically advantageous. At least two US states will likely advance China-specific counterintelligence legislation before October, fragmenting the response without federal coordination. France's and Germany's Palantir-replacement pledge will likely not produce a funded joint structure within 90 days given Future Combat Air System (FCAS)/Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) precedent. Summit cancellation or evidence tying Chinese entities to vote manipulation would alter these assessments.

IC Oversight & Policy

Trump Orders FBI, CIA, and ODNI to Investigate Alleged Cover-Up of Chinese Election Intelligence but Spares Beijing

BLUF: Trump's probe targets intelligence-community personnel who allegedly suppressed China findings, and naming Beijing as a formal investigation target remains unlikely within four months given active trade diplomacy.

In a Thursday address, Trump announced declassification of intelligence documents alleging China compromised roughly 220 million US voter files in 2020 and directed the FBI, CIA, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and DOJ to investigate what he called a "deep state" cover-up of the breach 123. A White House statement said one intelligence analyst admitted to "deliberately massaging" the President's Daily Brief to exclude the China-related intelligence from Trump, quoted a separate FBI official describing having run "a shadow government" within the bureau to withhold the material, and said Trump wants those responsible fired and, where appropriate, criminally charged 1. Politico reported that neither the White House nor DOJ has named Beijing as a target of the probes, with trade adviser Peter Navarro saying investigators will focus on "nefarious actors domestically" 4. The Chinese Embassy denied the allegations, and Newsweek reported that its review of the released documents, like a January 2021 intelligence assessment cited by Republic World, found no evidence any foreign actor altered 2020 election outcomes 23.

Analyst Note: The White House's refusal to name Beijing as a probe target, despite Trump's claim that China compromised 220 million voter files, signals the investigations are aimed at intelligence-community personnel rather than foreign accountability. Navarro's framing toward "nefarious actors domestically" points investigators at analysts who allegedly altered the President's Daily Brief, not at Chinese state entities. DOJ, FBI, CIA, or ODNI are unlikely to formally name the People's Republic of China (PRC) as an investigation target within the next four months, since doing so would complicate the September Trump-Xi summit and cut against the administration's parallel trade outreach. Moderate confidence reflects consistent signaling from Navarro and the White House against naming China, though the probe's scope remains undefined. Absent a naming, the effort will function chiefly as leverage against domestic intelligence officials.

Sources:

1: Setting the Record Straight: President Trump Declassifies Intel on Foreign Election Interference and Deep State Coverup - The White House

2: Trump's Presidential Address: Accuses China, 'Deep State' of Election Interference - Newsweek

3: 'Biggest Election Data Breach': Trump Alleges Massive Chinese Election Interference, Orders Probe Into 2020 'Cover-Up' - Republic World

4: Trump spares Beijing in probe of alleged Chinese election plot - Politico

Prior Reporting - [An Initial Readout of Trumps Election-Interference Speech](https://www.justsecurity.org/147633/trump-election-interference-speech/) (2026-07-17) - [Trump delivers primetime speech, claims declassified documents show US election vulnerabilities](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/16/politics/live-news/trump-speech-election) (2026-07-16) - [WHAT THEY ARE SAYING: President Trump Exposes Bombshell Evidence of Foreign Election Interference and Deep State Suppression](https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/07/what-they-are-saying-president-trump-exposes-bombshell-evidence-of-foreign-election-interference-and-deep-state-suppression/) (2026-07-16) - [Key takeaways from Trump's elections speech](https://abcnews.com/Politics/key-takeaways-trumps-elections-speech/story?id=134835191) (2026-07-16)

Clayton DNI Confirmation Hearing Exposes Rifts Over IC Independence as Nominee Refuses to Affirm 2020 Election Result

BLUF: Clayton will likely win confirmation within 60 days, institutionalizing an ODNI leadership unwilling to defend electoral legitimacy or account for its predecessor's domestic operations.

At his Senate Intelligence Committee confirmation hearing on Wednesday, DNI nominee Jay Clayton repeatedly declined to say whether Joe Biden won the 2020 election, stating only that the result was "certified" and that he was "not an election denier" 12. Sen. Jon Ossoff pressed Clayton on the question after other Democrats, including Mark Warner, Angus King and Mark Kelly, failed to get a direct answer, telling Clayton he was "not being honest or forthright with the committee" 12. Clayton said he learned only the day before, in a meeting with Ossoff, that predecessor Tulsi Gabbard had been present at an FBI raid of a Georgia election office in January, and said the ODNI's role is principally outside the United States 1. Clayton also declined to identify a source for his prior CNBC remark questioning mail-in ballot integrity, telling Sen. Ron Wyden he wanted to see the full quote before responding 1.

Analyst Note: At his confirmation hearing, Clayton repeatedly declined to affirm Biden's 2020 win, saying only that the result was "certified," and admitted he learned just a day earlier that Gabbard had been present at the FBI's Fulton County election-office raid, pointing to an office slow to reckon with its own recent conduct. Confirmation is likely within 60 days, and this posture will travel with him into office as ODNI's operating stance rather than a resolved dispute, with Republican unity carrying him past confirmation regardless of Democratic objections; the hedging may instead reflect calculated caution to protect the nomination rather than genuine doubt about the outcome. Confidence in this assessment is high, reflecting consistent hearing reporting and no signaled GOP defection, though sourcing rests on one primary account corroborated by a secondary outlet drawing on the same exchanges. Confirmation seats a DNI for Section 702 reauthorization and election-security oversight; failure leaves ODNI under an acting director lacking Senate-confirmed authority.

Sources:

1: Dems press DNI nominee Jay Clayton on election security questions, but leave dismayed - CyberScoop

2: Sen. Jon Ossoff presses Jay Clayton on who won 2020 election - The Hill

Prior Reporting - [Jay Clayton confirmation as DNI could pave way for extension of lapsed key surveillance tool](https://abcnews.com/Politics/clayton-confirmation-dni-pave-extension-lapsed-key-surveillance/story?id=134758107) (2026-07-15) - [Senate panel to hold hearing to confirm director of national intelligence](https://www.jns.org/news/u-s-news/senate-panel-to-hold-hearing-to-confirm-director-of-national-intelligence) (2026-07-10) - [Open Hearing: Nomination for the Honorable Walter "Jay" Clayton III to be Director of National Intelligence](https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings) (2026-07-10) - [Senate panel schedules confirmation hearing for DNI nominee Jay Clayton](https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2026/07/10/jay-clayton-hearing/2781783703846/) (2026-07-10) - [Jay Claytons US intelligence director nomination hearing set for July 15](https://kelo.com/2026/07/07/jay-claytons-us-intelligence-director-nomination-hearing-set-for-july-15/) (2026-07-08) - [Jay Clayton's US intelligence director nomination hearing set for July 15](https://wtvbam.com/2026/07/07/jay-claytons-us-intelligence-director-nomination-hearing-set-for-july-15/) (2026-07-07) - [Senate Panel Schedules Jay Clayton Confirmation Hearing](https://politicalwire.com/2026/07/07/senate-panel-schedules-jay-clayton-confirmation-hearing/) (2026-07-07)

HPSCI Hearing: Lawmakers Warn China Expanding Espionage and Cyber Operations Targeting American States

BLUF: State-level counterintelligence buildouts will remain fragmented and capability-uneven until Congress mandates a clearance and data-sharing framework that does not yet exist in legislative markup.

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held an open hearing on states' role in counterintelligence, at which Chairman Rick Crawford said China has adopted "a whole of society strategy" using legal investments, supply chains, research partnerships, cyber intrusions, influence operations and economic coercion, and cited the Volt Typhoon cyber campaign as evidence Beijing has "pre-positioned capabilities inside our critical infrastructure and telecommunications networks" 12. Ranking Member Jim Himes said counterintelligence can no longer remain a purely federal responsibility and called for balancing threat response with civil liberties protections 12. National Fusion Center Association President Mike Sena testified that China, Russia and Iran are increasingly targeting state and local governments, universities and industry, and said more than 3,200 personnel across 80 fusion centers are hampered by classification barriers, disconnected databases and clearance delays, urging a national information-sharing framework 12. State officials from Alabama, Florida and Nebraska described local counterintelligence and telecom-security initiatives, with Florida Representative Daniel Alvarez saying "Florida will not wait for the federal government to defend our people" 12.

Analyst Note: At HPSCI's hearing, testimony citing Volt Typhoon confirms adversary access inside US critical infrastructure and telecommunications predates detection and remains capable of activation on demand, shifting the threat from espionage collection toward disruption capability. Sena's disclosure that classification barriers and disconnected databases hobble 3,200 fusion center personnel across 80 centers marks the operational bottleneck constraining state-level detection, while Florida's, Alabama's and Nebraska's legislatures are already hardening telecom procurement independently of Washington, pointing toward a decentralized, uneven policy response rather than a unified federal framework. Sourcing rests on a single wire account reproduced verbatim with HPSCI's hearing record as sole corroboration, and the testimony may equally reflect fusion centers and state officials building a public record to justify funding and expanded authority rather than responding to a genuine escalation in adversary activity.

Sources:

1: US lawmakers warn China expanding espionage, cyber operations targeting American states - IANS

2: China Espionage Targets US States, Lawmakers Warn - New Kerala

Crawford Announces Open Full Committee Hearing to Examine States on the Frontlines of Counterintelligence - House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)

US lawmakers warn China expanding espionage, cyber operations targeting American states - IANS

Prior Reporting - [Crawford Announces Open Full Committee Hearing to Examine States on the Frontlines of Counterintelligence](https://intelligence.house.gov/2026/07/09/crawford-announces-open-full-committee-hearing-to-examine-states-on-the-frontlines-of-counterintelligence/) (2026-07-09)

Allied Intelligence

France and Germany Pledge European Alternative to Palantir After DGSI and BND Drop US Intelligence Software

BLUF: Franco-German declarations rarely survive industrial-share disputes, and a formal joint program or funding agreement is unlikely before January 2027 despite both countries actively dropping Palantir contracts.

France and Germany pledged Friday, in a joint declaration after talks between Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz, to develop a European alternative to Palantir's military AI software and to examine a "European sovereign digital backbone" spanning data-centric security, AI, and cloud solutions 12. The pledge follows France's domestic intelligence service Direction Generale de la Securite Interieure (French Domestic Intelligence) (DGSI) ending its Palantir contract in June and Germany's BfV, the domestic intelligence agency, selecting French firm ChapsVision's ArgonOS platform for the same role 1. The declaration named France's Arcadia command-and-control platform, which the French Army has tested as a substitute for Palantir's Maven Smart System, alongside unspecified "comparable German solutions," Benzinga reported 23. The two governments pledged a "European collaborative combat standard" for cross-national interoperability. Benzinga cited US Undersecretary of Defense Elbridge Colby saying no country rivals the American defense industrial base 3.

Analyst Note: The declaration converts two national contract terminations into a bilateral industrial commitment, treating Palantir's displacement as a joint sovereignty project rather than parallel procurement choices. Arcadia's battlefield testing against Maven gives France an operational head start, while Germany's unnamed "comparable" systems and ChapsVision's separate footprint point to industrial overlap that Franco-German programs like FCAS have historically taken years to resolve. Low confidence reflects the declaration's study-phase language, the absence of any named budget or organizational structure, and the FCAS/MGCS precedent of multi-year delays from declaration to funded program. Washington's public dismissal of European capability, voiced by Undersecretary Colby, means the shift will draw no diplomatic cover and must prove itself on technical merit alone.

Sources:

1: France, Germany vow to develop Palantir rival - Politico EU

2: France and Germany pledge to build a European rival to Palantir's military AI software - The Next Web

3: Palantir Faces Potential Setback as France, Germany Seek European Military Software Supplier - Benzinga

Conclusions du Conseil franco-allemand de défense et de sécurité du 17 juillet 2026 - Élysée (French Presidency)

Prior Reporting - [French domestic spy agency ditches Palantir for local rival, PM says](https://www.rappler.com/technology/french-dgsi-spy-agency-ditches-palantir-rival-chapsvision/) (2026-06-16) - [French Security Service to Replace Palantir With Local Software](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-16/french-security-service-to-replace-palantir-with-local-software) (2026-06-16) - [DGSI drops Palantir for French firm, says Sébastien Lecornu](https://www.euronews.com/business/2026/06/16/dgsi-drops-palantir-for-french-firm-says-sebastien-lecornu) (2026-06-16) - [French spies drop AI giant Palantir over US overreliance fears](https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260616-french-spies-drop-ai-giant-palantir-over-us-overreliance-fears) (2026-06-16)

Ukrainian Businessman Accuses HUR Military Intelligence of Monaco Assassination Attempt; Kyiv Says Officers Acted Without Leadership Knowledge

BLUF: Kyiv's "rogue officers" framing is unlikely to be formally reversed before mid-January 2027, absent sworn testimony or documentary evidence linking Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine (HUR) leadership to the Monaco operation.

Vadym Iermolaiev, the Ukrainian businessman injured in the June 29 Monaco bombing, said in a letter released through his law firm and reported by Nice-Matin that serving HUR officers were "directly involved" in the attempt on his life, with some tied to the agency's current or former leadership 12345. Iermolaiev, whom Kyiv sanctioned in 2023 over alleged Russia ties he denies, called on authorities in Monaco, Ukraine and France and unspecified international institutions to guarantee protection for his family, witnesses and lawyers until all responsible, including whoever ordered the attack, are held accountable 24. Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) have said the two men charged in the case, serving HUR officer Vladyslav Reut and former SBU officer Vitaliy Zhykovych, acted without HUR leadership's knowledge 145. HUR spokesman Andriy Yusov rejected Iermolaiev's accusations as "political statements" that harm the investigation 3. Reut initially confessed to killing bombing suspect Anastasiia Berezovska but told a Kyiv court on July 9 that Zhykovych had fired the fatal shots 34.

Analyst Note: Iermolaiev's letter directly contradicts Kyiv's account that Reut and Zhykovych acted alone. If the claim holds, HUR leadership faces accusations of sanctioning a lethal operation on European soil rather than merely failing to detect a rogue subordinate. Reut's reversal on the witness stand, from confessing to Berezovska's killing to blaming Zhykovych, undermines confidence in either man's account of who ordered the Monaco attack. HUR's dismissal of the accusation as political statements indicates the agency intends to contest the claim publicly rather than open an independent inquiry. Low confidence in any assessment of HUR leadership culpability reflects that no evidence beyond Iermolaiev's own letter has surfaced to corroborate his account.

Sources:

1: Iermolaiev accuses Ukrainian intelligence officers of trying to kill him in Monaco - Kyiv Independent

2: Businessman injured in Monaco blast claims Ukraine's Defence Intelligence attempted to kill him and his family, seeks protection - Ukrainska Pravda

3: Sanctioned Ukrainian businessman Vadym Yermolaiev accuses Ukrainian military intelligence officers of organizing the attempt on his life in Monaco - Meduza

4: Ukrainian spies tried to assassinate me, says tycoon injured in Monaco blast - The Telegraph

5: Target of Monaco bomb blames attack on Ukrainian spy agency - The Guardian

Prior Reporting - [Monaco bombing suspect found shot dead and intelligence officer arrested in Ukraine](https://www.thejournal.ie/monaco-bombing-suspect-found-dead-in-ukraine-7094195-Jul2026/) (2026-07-07) - [Monaco bombing attack suspect found shot dead in Ukraine, officials say](https://edition.cnn.com/2026/07/07/europe/monaco-suspect-body-found-ukraine-intl) (2026-07-07) - [Suspect in Monaco bomb attack on Ukrainian tycoon found dead in Kyiv](https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/suspect-monaco-bomb-attack-ukrainian-tycoon-found-dead-kyiv-rcna353285) (2026-07-07) - [Woman suspected in Monaco bomb attack on Ukrainian magnate found dead in Kyiv](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/monaco-bomb-ukraine-magnate-suspect-found-dead-in-kyiv/) (2026-07-07) - [Monaco bombing attack suspect found shot dead in Ukraine, officials say](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/07/europe/monaco-suspect-body-found-ukraine-intl) (2026-07-07) - [Woman suspected of attempted murder of businessman Yermolaiev in Monaco found dead near Kyiv](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/07/07/8042718/) (2026-07-07) - [Woman suspected of trying to kill tycoon in Monaco bombing found dead in Ukraine](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/woman-suspected-of-trying-to-kill-tycoon-in-monaco-bombing-found-dead-in-ukraine) (2026-07-07)

French Pacific Commander Confirms France Had Advance Intelligence Notice of Chinas SLBM Test Launch Into South Pacific

BLUF: Paris is trading silence on a potential Treaty of Rarotonga violation for preserved diplomatic space with Beijing, prioritizing its resident Pacific power identity over nonproliferation enforcement.

Rear Adm. Guillaume Pinget, Commander of French Pacific Command, told Naval News in a July 10 interview that France had advance notice of China's submarine-launched ballistic missile test into the South Pacific, saying "France had been advised of the imminence of the launch" 1. Pinget said France maintains an independent assessment of the launch while coordinating with allies and partners, and characterized the test as a demonstration of nuclear deterrence credibility 1. Asked about implications under the Treaty of Rarotonga's South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone protocols, which France ratified in 1996, Pinget declined to offer a legal interpretation, saying such questions belong to diplomats 1. He also confirmed French naval vessels will continue transiting the Taiwan Strait "when required, when needed" 1.

Analyst Note: Pinget's confirmation, sourced only to a single Naval News interview with no independent corroboration, points to either a bilateral notification channel with Beijing or independent French collection capable of detecting Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) launch preparations, though the "advance notice" may equally reflect routine Chinese maritime safety notices rather than a privileged heads-up. His refusal to invoke the Treaty of Rarotonga avoids a legal characterization that could force a formal protest against a partner Paris does not intend to confront, and pairing continued Taiwan Strait transits with deterrence-framing of the test signals no posture adjustment, reinforcing France's self-description as a resident Pacific power rather than an outside observer.

Sources:

1: French Pacific Commander Says France Had Advance Notice of China SLBM Launch - Naval News

Prior Reporting - [China conducts first-ever strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile test in Pacific Ocean](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/china-submarine-ballistic-missile-test-pacific-2026) (2026-07-06) - [China conducts rare submarine-launched ballistic missile test, angering Pacific neighbors](https://www.cnn.com/2026/07/06/china/china-tests-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile-intl-hnk-ml) (2026-07-06) - [Prior to launch, Japan 'strongly urged' China to reconsider missile test in Pacific](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2026/07/06/asia-pacific/china-submarine-missile-pacific/) (2026-07-06) - [China test-launches ballistic missile from sub in South Pacific, drawing protests](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-ballistic-missile-test-launch-submarine-south-pacific/) (2026-07-06) - [Chinese navy conducts test launch of strategic missile by submarine](http://eng.mod.gov.cn/2025xb/H_251589/F/16472155.html) (2026-07-06)

Adversary Intelligence

Iran Ministry of Intelligence Publicly Lists Israeli Defense Journalist Yossi Melman as Hostile Target

BLUF: Criminalizing routine contact with named journalists under espionage law extends Iran's information quarantine beyond classified material, treating open-source reporting as a prosecutable security threat.

Iran's Ministry of Intelligence published an official document in the state gazette on July 12, listing "hostile elements" whose contact with Iranian citizens can trigger prosecution under a law increasing penalties for espionage and cooperation with Israel 12. The list categorizes targets into three tiers: 44 hostile networks, 61 hostile media persons, and 310 hostile virtual pages, and names Israeli journalists Yossi Melman, Amit Segal, and Dr. Raz Zimmt, JNS host Emily Schrader (ranked second among the media persons), Israeli-Arab activist Yoseph Haddad, and Iranian opposition figures Reza Pahlavi, Shirin Ebadi, Masih Alinejad, and Ali Karimi 12. The directive, sent by the Intelligence Ministry to Iran's Attorney General on June 13, states that political, cultural, media, or propaganda-related contact with listed individuals can constitute a security offense, and that new accounts they create will be treated the same way. JNS reporting instead ties the categorized breakdown to a separate Ministry letter to the prosecutor general dated May 3, leaving the underlying document timeline unreconciled across outlets 1. Melman, writing in SpyTalk, said he is the only Israeli defense and security commentator among the Israelis named 3.

Analyst Note: Iran's directive criminalizes ordinary contact rather than classified disclosure, treating political, cultural, media, or propaganda-related engagement with named figures as prosecutable espionage, and extends the same liability to any new account a listed individual opens, closing an evasion route and signaling the measure is built to persist beyond a single publication cycle. Melman's inclusion alongside Segal and Zimmt marks Tehran's first naming of an Israeli defense commentator specifically, widening the target set from politicians and diaspora activists to working journalists. A June 13 directive to the Attorney General preceded the July 12 gazette publication by nearly a month, indicating internal legal preparation predated the public warning. Sourcing rests on a single primary gazette document with secondary amplification, and the listing may instead function primarily as domestic messaging to deter Iranian citizens from Israeli media contact rather than as an operational threat against journalists abroad.

Sources:

1: IRAN TARGETS AMIT SEGAL: Contact With Israeli Journalist Could Lead To Years In Prison - The Yeshiva World

2: Iran marks popular Israeli journalist as enemy target - Israel National News

3: How I Became a Target of Iranian Intelligence - SpyTalk

⁨مصادیق تبصره ماده (4) قانون تشدید مجازات جاسوسی و همکاری با صهیونیستی (Instances of the Note to Article 4 of the Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime)⁩ - Ekhtebar (Iranian legal-news portal / National Portal for Laws and Regulations, official gazette republication)

[⁨مصادیق تبصره ماده (4) قانون تشدید مجازات جاسوسی و همکاری با صهیونیستی [Instances Under the Note to Article 4 of the Law on Intensifying Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime]⁩](https://www.ekhtebar.ir/%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%82-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-4-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA/) - Ekhtebar (Iranian legal/regulatory news portal, republishing Ministry of Intelligence circular text)

Iran unveils 'enemies list,' includes JNS host - JNS (Jewish News Syndicate)

Former Moroccan Intelligence Officer Reveals DGST Deployed Pegasus Against Journalist Through UAE-Linked Intermediary

BLUF: Named sourcing of the Direction Generale de la Surveillance du Territoire (Moroccan Domestic Intelligence) (DGST)-to-NSO Group (NSO) procurement chain through an Emirati cutout erodes Morocco's plausible deniability and reopens its exposure to European human-rights litigation it previously deflected.

A former DGST officer using the pseudonym "Safir" told Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and Forbidden Stories that Morocco's domestic intelligence service deployed Pegasus against journalist Omar Radi through an Emirati intermediary, FSSYS Maroc, a subsidiary of Al Fahad Smart Systems later acquired by EDGE, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)'s state-owned defense conglomerate 12. Safir said NSO demonstrated Pegasus for DGST officers at a Rabat villa in 2017, and that DGST director Abdeljalil Taki's unit routed target phone numbers through the intermediary or directly to NSO for infection 12. A second Moroccan intelligence source, speaking anonymously, corroborated procurement of Pegasus access through an intermediary and the targeting of a journalist 1. Reporters separately obtained a document showing NSO co-founder Shalev Hulio entered Panama in 2013 on an Israeli diplomatic passport, which Hulio denies holding; Moroccan authorities, NSO Group, and Israeli officials did not respond to requests for comment 12.

Analyst Note: Pseudonymous testimony from a former DGST officer supplies the first named procurement chain behind Morocco's Pegasus use, tying director Abdeljalil Taki's unit to an Emirati intermediary structured to sever direct payment ties between Rabat and NSO, an architecture now publicly attributed to Al Fahad Smart Systems and linked to Abu Dhabi's Edge conglomerate. Prior 2021 Pegasus Project reporting already established the Radi and Monjib targeting; this account adds the UAE-brokered mechanism, names the DGST officials who ran it, and surfaces NSO co-founder Shalev Hulio's undisclosed Israeli diplomatic passport, undercutting NSO's arm's-length claim from the Israeli state. The core claim rests on single-source testimony corroborated only by one anonymous Moroccan intelligence contact, and the leak may reflect one faction's version of an internally contested procurement history rather than a verified consortium finding. Confirmed, it exposes Morocco to renewed defamation and human-rights litigation in European courts where it previously prevailed on denial alone.

Sources:

1: Moroccan Government Used Powerful Israeli Pegasus Spyware, Former Intelligence Officer Says - OCCRP

2: Codename "Morgan": how Morocco accessed Pegasus, involving Israel and the United Arab Emirates - Forbidden Stories

COLLECTION GAPS

UNCLASSIFIED // OPEN SOURCE